Arbeitspapier
Independence, Heterogeneity and Uniqueness in Interaction Games
This paper shows that incomplete information and sufficient heterogeneity of players can ensure uniqueness in interaction games. In contrast to recent work on uniqueness in interaction games, we do not require strategic complementarity. There are two parts to the argument. First, if a players signal is sufficiently uninformative of the signals of its opponents (in the sense of the Fisher information of the signal), then the players best response to any strategy profile of its opponents is non-decreasing in its signal. Secondly, a contraction mapping argument shows that sufficient heterogeneity ensures that equilibrium is unique.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: IEHAS Discussion Papers ; No. MT-DP - 2003/3
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Subject
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Co-ordination
Interaction games
Heterogeneity
Unique equilibrium
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Mason, Robin
Valentinyi, Akos
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics
- (where)
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Budapest
- (when)
-
2003
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Mason, Robin
- Valentinyi, Akos
- Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics
Time of origin
- 2003
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