Arbeitspapier

The agency of CoCo: Why do banks issue contingent convertible bonds?

Why do banks issue contingent convertible debt? To answer this question we study comprehensive data covering all issues by publicly traded banks in Europe of contingent convertible bonds (CoCos) that count as additional tier 1 capital (AT1). We find that banks with lower asset volatility are more likely to issue AT1 CoCos than their riskier counterparts, but that CDS spreads do not react following issue announcements. Our estimates therefore suggest that agency costs play a crucial role in banks' ability to successfully issue CoCos. The agency costs may be higher for CoCos than for equity explaining why we observe riskier or lowly capitalized banks to issue equity rather than CoCos.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CFS Working Paper Series ; No. 586

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Financial Crises
Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage; Ratings and Ratings Agencies
Thema
CoCos
Contingent Convertible Bonds
Bank Capital Structure

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Goncharenko, Roman
Ongena, Steven
Rauf, Asad
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Goethe University Frankfurt, Center for Financial Studies (CFS)
(wo)
Frankfurt a. M.
(wann)
2017

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-437353
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Goncharenko, Roman
  • Ongena, Steven
  • Rauf, Asad
  • Goethe University Frankfurt, Center for Financial Studies (CFS)

Entstanden

  • 2017

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