Arbeitspapier

Labor Mobility and Fiscal Policy in a Currency Union

Labor mobility is commonly taken as a property of an optimal currency area. But how does that property affect the outcome of fiscal policies? In our model, we show that perfect (costless) labour mobility is not necessarily welfare improving, since it prevents the national fiscal authorities from pursuing independent policies, opening the way to a coordination prob-lem. With symmetric shocks, the federal fiscal policy can improve welfare by playing a coordinating role. With asymmetric shocks, the federal policy allows both countries to reach a higher productive efficiency, provided the federal government is endowed with a federal budget.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 5159

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Fiscal Policy
Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession
Thema
currency union
labor mobility
fiscal policy
federation

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Baglioni, Angelo
Boitani, Andrea
Bordignon, Massimo
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2015

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Baglioni, Angelo
  • Boitani, Andrea
  • Bordignon, Massimo
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2015

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