Arbeitspapier

Minimum Taxes and Repeated Tax Competition

An agreement about a lower bound for admissible tax rates can reduce the equilibrium tax rate (and thus welfare) in tax competition among fully symmetric countries. This is shown in an infinitely repeated game where the stage game describes the standard tax competition model with source-based taxes and symmetric countries. Repeated interaction may allow countries to sustain cooperation through implicit contracts. Lower bounds on tax rates ('minimum taxes') restrict the ability of countries to punish deviators. This makes cooperation harder to sustain. The introduction of a lower bound on feasible tax rates may thus harm all countries.

ISBN
978-615-5024-50-4
Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IEHAS Discussion Papers ; No. MT-DP - 2011/16

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
International Investment; Long-term Capital Movements
International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods
Thema
tax competition
tax harmonization
minimum tax
tax floor
repeated games
Unternehmensbesteuerung
Steuertarif
Steuerwettbewerb
Steuerharmonisierung
Wiederholte Spiele
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Kiss, Áron
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics
(wo)
Budapest
(wann)
2011

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Kiss, Áron
  • Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2011

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