Arbeitspapier
Tax competition under minimum rates : the case of European diesel excises
This paper estimates Nash-type fiscal reaction functions for European governments competing for revenue from diesel excises. It appears that European governments strategically set their excise levels by responding to their neighbors? tax rates. This provides evidence for the presence of tax competition in diesel excises. In fact, a 10 percent higher rate in neighboring countries (in terms of the user price) induces a country to raise its own rate by between 2 and 3 percent. This impact is robust for alternative specifications. By imposing restrictions on excise levels, EU harmonization of excises in 1987 and the introduction of a minimum in 1992 exerted a positive impact on the excise level in a number of EU countries. It has not, however, significantly reduced the intensity of tax competition. Indeed, strategic tax responses have not significantly been reduced by these harmonization policies. We also find that high-tax countries appear to compete more aggressively than low-tax countries in the sense that they feature larger strategic tax responses. There is no significant difference between large and small countries.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 1221
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods
Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession
Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- Subject
-
Diesel excise
strategic tax setting
minimum rates
European Union
Dieselkraftstoff
Mineralölsteuer
Steuerwettbewerb
EU-Steuerrecht
Theorie
EU-Staaten
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Evers, Michiel
De Mooij, Ruud A.
Vollebergh, Herman R. J.
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (where)
-
Munich
- (when)
-
2004
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Evers, Michiel
- De Mooij, Ruud A.
- Vollebergh, Herman R. J.
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Time of origin
- 2004
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Royalty Taxation under Tax Competition and Profit Shifting
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Learning to tax: Interjurisdictional tax competition under incomplete information
Constrained Tax Competition – Empirical Effects of the Minimum Tax Rate on the Tax Rate Distribution
Minimum Quality Standard Under Cournot Competition and Pollution
Tax Principles and Tax Harmonization under Imperfect Competition: A Cautionary Example
Royalty Taxation under Tax Competition and Profit Shifting
The Estimation of Reaction Functions under Tax Competition
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