Arbeitspapier

Shallow Lake Economics Run Deep: Nonlinear Aspects of an Economic-Ecological Interest Conflict

Outcomes of the shallow lake interest conflict are presented in a number of different contexts: quasi-static and dynamic social planning, and quasi-static one-shot and repeated non-cooperative play. As the underlying dynamics are non-convex, the analysis uses geometrical-numerical methods: the possible kinds of solutions are efficiently classified in bifurcation diagrams.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 09-033/1

Classification
Wirtschaft
Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Ecological Economics: Ecosystem Services; Biodiversity Conservation; Bioeconomics; Industrial Ecology
Subject
Shallow lake
optimal management
dynamic games
bifurcation analysis
Gewässerschutz
Sozialer Konflikt
Dynamisches Spiel
Mathematische Optimierung
Nichtlineare dynamische Systeme
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Wagener, F.O.O.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Tinbergen Institute
(where)
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
(when)
2009

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Wagener, F.O.O.
  • Tinbergen Institute

Time of origin

  • 2009

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