Arbeitspapier

An empirical assessment of the 2004 EU merger policy reform

We propose a general framework to assess merger policy effectiveness based on standard oligopoly theory and stock market reactions. We focus on four different dimensions of effectiveness: 1) legal certainty, 2) decision errors, 3) reversion of anti-competitive rents, and 4) deterrence. We apply this framework to 368 merger cases scrutinized by the European Commission (EC) between 1990 and 2007. To evaluate the economic impact of the change in European merger legislation, we compare the results of the four tests before and after its introduction in 2004. Our results suggest that the 'more economic approach' resulted in improved ex-ante predictability of decisions and a reduction of the frequency of type I errors. Merger policy enforcement deters anti-competitive mergers without over-deterring pro-competitive transactions. Yet, the policy shift away from prohibitions, which are effective as a policy tool and as a deterrent mechanism, does not seem to be well-grounded.

ISBN
978-3-86304-057-4
Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: DICE Discussion Paper ; No. 58

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Antitrust Law
Estimation: General
Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
Thema
merger control
regulatory reform
EU Commission
event-study
Fusionskontrolle
Reform
Wirkungsanalyse
Wettbewerb
Schätzung
EU-Staaten

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Duso, Tomaso
Gugler, Klaus
Szücs, Florian
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
(wo)
Düsseldorf
(wann)
2012

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Duso, Tomaso
  • Gugler, Klaus
  • Szücs, Florian
  • Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)

Entstanden

  • 2012

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