Arbeitspapier

Managing social comparison costs in organizations

This paper studies how organizations manage the social comparisons that arise when their employees' pay and tasks, and hence their status vis-à-vis peers, differ. We show that under a "pay transparency policy", the organization may compress pay and distort the employees' tasks to minimize social comparison costs. We subsequently show that if the organization can credibly commit to informal agreements, it may remove social comparisons by implementing a "pay secrecy" policy. Under such a policy, the organization makes employees "officially equal" by granting them similar formal terms, while optimally differentiating their pay through self-enforcing informal adjustments.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Papers ; No. 2018-25

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
Personnel Economics: Labor Management
Thema
Social Comparisons
Organization Design
Informal Contracts
Formal Contracts

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Contreras, Óscar F.
Zanarone, Giorgio
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Banco de México
(wo)
Ciudad de México
(wann)
2018

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Contreras, Óscar F.
  • Zanarone, Giorgio
  • Banco de México

Entstanden

  • 2018

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