Arbeitspapier
Managing social comparison costs in organizations
This paper studies how organizations manage the social comparisons that arise when their employees' pay and tasks, and hence their status vis-à-vis peers, differ. We show that under a "pay transparency policy", the organization may compress pay and distort the employees' tasks to minimize social comparison costs. We subsequently show that if the organization can credibly commit to informal agreements, it may remove social comparisons by implementing a "pay secrecy" policy. Under such a policy, the organization makes employees "officially equal" by granting them similar formal terms, while optimally differentiating their pay through self-enforcing informal adjustments.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Working Papers ; No. 2018-25
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
Personnel Economics: Labor Management
- Thema
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Social Comparisons
Organization Design
Informal Contracts
Formal Contracts
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Contreras, Óscar F.
Zanarone, Giorgio
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Banco de México
- (wo)
-
Ciudad de México
- (wann)
-
2018
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Contreras, Óscar F.
- Zanarone, Giorgio
- Banco de México
Entstanden
- 2018