Arbeitspapier

Asymmetric Labor Markets, Southern Wages, and the Location of Firms

This paper studies the behavior of firms towards weak labor rights in developing countries (South). A less than perfectly elastic labor supply in the South gives firms oligopsonistic power tempting them to strategically reduce output to cut wages. In an open economy, competitors operating in perfectly competitive labor markets meanwhile enjoy less aggressive competitors and raise output. Finally, competition effect reduces the ex-post output of a relocating firm. These effects reduce relative profitability of the South casting doubts on traditional beliefs that multinationals are attracted to regions with lower wages. Adopting a minimum wage unambiguously enhances Southern competitiveness and welfare.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 17.2005

Classification
Wirtschaft
Labor Standards: General
Multinational Firms; International Business
Monopsony; Segmented Labor Markets
Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
Production Analysis and Firm Location: Government Policy
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Subject
Labor standards
Labor market imperfection
Oligopsony
Location of firms
Minimum wages
Strategic behavior
Multinationals
Southern welfare

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Naghavi, Alireza
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
(where)
Milano
(when)
2005

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Naghavi, Alireza
  • Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Time of origin

  • 2005

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