Arbeitspapier

Altruism and envy in contests: an evolutionarily stable symbiosis

Altruists and envious people who meet in contests are symbionts. They do better than a population of narrowly rational individuals. If there are only altruists and envious individuals, a particular mixture of altruists and envious individuals is evolutionarily stable.

Alternative title
Altruismus und Neid in Turnieren: Eine evolutionär-stabile Symbiose
Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: WZB Discussion Paper ; No. FS IV 02-19

Classification
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
Subject
Altruism
envy
contests
evolutionary stability

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Konrad, Kai A.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
(where)
Berlin
(when)
2002

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Konrad, Kai A.
  • Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)

Time of origin

  • 2002

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