Arbeitspapier

Hospital competition and quality with regulated prices

We analyse the effect of competition on quality in hospital markets with regulated prices, considering both the effect of (i) introducing competition (monopoly versus competition) and (ii) increasing competition through lower transportation costs (increased substitutability) or a higher number of hospitals. With semi-altruistic providers and a fairly general cost structure, we show that the relationship between competition and quality is generally ambiguous. In contrast to the received theoretical literature, this is consistent with, and potentially explains, the mixed empirical evidence.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 2635

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Publicly Provided Private Goods
Analysis of Health Care Markets
Health: Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Thema
hospitals
competition
quality
Krankenhaus
Dienstleistungsqualität
Nichtpreiswettbewerb
Unvollkommener Markt
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Brekke, Kurt R.
Siciliani, Luigi
Straume, Odd Rune
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2009

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Brekke, Kurt R.
  • Siciliani, Luigi
  • Straume, Odd Rune
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2009

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