Hospital competition and quality with regulated prices

Arbeitspapier

We analyse the effect of competition on quality in hospital markets with regulated prices, considering both the effect of (i) introducing competition (monopoly versus competition) and (ii) increasing competition through lower transportation costs (increased substitutability) or a higher number of hospitals. With semi-altruistic providers and a fairly general cost structure, we show that the relationship between competition and quality is generally ambiguous. In contrast to the received theoretical literature, this is consistent with, and potentially explains, the mixed empirical evidence.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 2635

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Publicly Provided Private Goods ; Analysis of Health Care Markets ; Health: Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
• Subject: hospitals ; competition ; quality ; Krankenhaus ; Dienstleistungsqualität ; Nichtpreiswettbewerb ; Unvollkommener Markt ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Brekke, Kurt R. ; Siciliani, Luigi ; Straume, Odd Rune
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2009

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30561
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET