Competitive trilateral lobbying for and against subsidizing green energy

Arbeitspapier

A small open economy operates a carbon emission trading scheme and subsidizes green energy. Taking cap-and-trade as given, we seek to explain the subsidy as the outcome of a trilateral tug of war between the green energy industry, the black energy industry and consumers. With parametric functions we fully solve the competitive economic equilibrium and the lobbying Nash equilibrium. We show how the resultant subsidy depends on the political influence of all three lobbying groups and we trace its determinants. Whether consumers have green preferences turns out to be crucial for the results.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge ; No. 150-11

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Alternative Energy Sources ; Energy and the Macroeconomy ; Pollution Control Adoption and Costs; Distributional Effects; Employment Effects ; Climate; Natural Disasters and Their Management; Global Warming ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation ; Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
• Thema: green preferences ; fossil fuel ; green energy ; green energy subsidy ; cap-and-trade ; overlapping regulation ; competitive lobbying, ; Interessenpolitik ; Förderung regenerativer Energien ; Wettbewerb ; Emissionshandel ; Fossiler Energieträger ; Umweltbewusstsein ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Pethig, Rüdiger
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Universität Siegen, Fakultät III, Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrecht
• (wo): Siegen
• (wann): 2011

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57265
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ