Inheritance law and investment in family firms

Arbeitspapier

Entrepreneurs may be constrained by the law to bequeath a minimal stake to non-controlling heirs. The size of this stake can reduce investment in family firms, by reducing the future income they can pledge to external financiers. Using a purpose-built indicator of the permissiveness of inheritance law and data for 10,245 firms from 32 countries over the 1990-2006 interval, we find that stricter inheritance law is associated with lower investment in family firms, while it leaves investment unaffected in non-family firms. Moreover, as predicted by the model, inheritance law affects investment only in family firms that experience a succession.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 06.2009

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
• Thema: Succession ; Family Firms ; Inheritance Law ; Growth ; Investment ; Erbrecht ; Familienunternehmen ; Betriebliche Investitionspolitik ; Welt

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Panunzi, Fausto ; Ellul, Andrew ; Pagano, Marco
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
• (wo): Milano
• (wann): 2009

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/53376
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:46 MEZ