Download for Free - When Do Providers of Digital Goods Offer Free Samples?

Arbeitspapier

In a monopoly setting where consumers cannot observe the quality of the product we show that free samples which are of a lower quality than the marketed digital goods are used together with high prices as signals for a superior quality if the number of informed consumers is small and if the difference between the high and the low quality is not too small. Social welfare is higher, if the monopolist uses also free samples as signals, compared to a situation where he is restricted to pure price signalling. Both, the monopolist and consumers benefit from the additional signal.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 70

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Firm Behavior: Theory ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility
• Thema: Digital Goods ; Free Samples ; Multi-dimensional Signalling

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Boom, Anette
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
• (wo): München
• (wann): 2004

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13480
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/93801
• URN: urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13480-5
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ