Indirect reciprocity with optional interactions and private information

Artikel

We consider indirect reciprocity with optional interactions and private information. A game is offered between two players and accepted unless it is known that the other person is a defector. Whenever a defector manages to exploit a cooperator, his or her reputation is revealed to others in the population with some probability. Therefore, people have different private information about the reputation of others, which is a setting that is difficult to analyze in the theory of indirect reciprocity. Since a defector loses a fraction of his social ties each time he exploits a cooperator, he is less efficient at exploiting cooperators in subsequent rounds. We analytically calculate the critical benefit-to-cost ratio above which cooperation is successful in various settings. We demonstrate quantitative agreement with simulation results of a corresponding Wright-Fisher process with optional interactions and private information. We also deduce a simple necessary condition for the critical benefit-to-cost ratio.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Journal: Games ; ISSN: 2073-4336 ; Volume: 6 ; Year: 2015 ; Issue: 4 ; Pages: 438-457 ; Basel: MDPI

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft
• Subject: indirect reciprocity ; cooperation ; evolutionary dynamics

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Olejarz, Jason ; Ghang, Whan ; Nowak, Martin A.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): MDPI
• (where): Basel
• (when): 2015

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.3390/g6040438
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/167954
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET