Arbeitspapier

Prices and Mergers in a General Model of Multi-Sided Markets

We present a general and tractable oligopoly model of multi-sided platforms with endogenous side and platform choices of heterogeneous end-users, considering any mix of single-homing and multi-homing platforms and in which participating on one side could preclude doing so on others. We show the existence of a unique equilibrium number of end-users and characterize optimal platform pricing. Using the equilibrium conditions, we formally derive (across sides and platforms) switching effects that distort optimal pricing, which can lead to markups exceeding the Lerner index and rule out the classical "cross-subsidization" result. We then provide a unifying framework to analyze multi-sided platform mergers, which rationalizes mixed results from the previous literature by providing, based on the switching effects, a set of conditions that predict the upward pricing pressure post-merger. We show that while optimal pricing is determined by the nature of end-users' side choices, their platform choices are crucial for merger analysis.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 10818

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Firm Organization and Market Structure
Information and Internet Services; Computer Software
Thema
multi-sided markets
heterogeneous end-users
endogenous side choice
mergers of platforms
digital platforms

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Bajo-Buenestado, Raúl
Kinateder, Markus
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2023

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Bajo-Buenestado, Raúl
  • Kinateder, Markus
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2023

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