Hot Air as an Implicit Side Payment Arrangement: Could a Hot Air Provision have Saved the Kyoto-Agreement?

Arbeitspapier

The purpose of this paper is to analyse whether the presence of Hot Air trading jeopardizes the environmental target of an international environmental agree-ment. We argue that Hot Air can be used as an implicit side-payment mecha-nism to actually bring about higher environmental protection compared to the situation without the trade option. We point to the existence of a fundamental trade-off between costs of compliance and the creation of dynamic incentives to develop cheaper reduction technologies. Implicit side-payments, in terms of Hot Air provision, may be needed in order to establish a compromise between these opposing demands. We identify the shortcomings and benefits of allowing fully flexible permit trading including the allocation rule of grandfathering.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: IME Working Paper ; No. 42

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Renewable Resources and Conservation: Government Policy
• Thema: Hot Air ; Global GHG trade ; Kyoto protocol ; Grandfathering ; Cost issue ; Emissionshandel ; Internationale Umweltpolitik ; Klimaschutz ; Welt

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Brandt, Urs Steiner ; Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics (IME)
• (wo): Esbjerg
• (wann): 2003

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/83109
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ