Arbeitspapier

Public service delivery and free riding: Experimental evidence from India

This paper provides novel evidence on the trade-off between public service delivery and free riding in low- and middle-income countries. We implement a field experiment in the slums of two major Indian cities, where inadequate access to sanitation restricts residents to either free ride, by disposing human waste in common-property areas, or use a fee-funded public service provided by community toilets. Using original survey, behavioral and objective measurements, we show that top-down incentives for the quality of service provision improves delivery and reduces non-payment of fees, but excludes a share of residents from using the service, forcing them into free riding. Willingness to pay for the service is unaffected, but demand for public intervention in the quality of delivery increases, replacing the demand to address free riding. Adding a campaign sensitizing the consequences of free riding among residents raises awareness, but does not induce any behavioral change. Supplementing reduced form estimates with structural estimates, we show that eliminating free riding requires subsidizing use beyond free basic services.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IFS Working Paper ; No. W22/16

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Field Experiments
Publicly Provided Goods: General
Health and Economic Development
Air Pollution; Water Pollution; Noise; Hazardous Waste; Solid Waste; Recycling
Thema
ublic service
basic services
infrastructure
maintenance
free riding
willingness to pay
water and sanitation
information
health

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Armand, Alex
Augsburg, Britta
Bancalari, Antonella
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS)
(wo)
London
(wann)
2022

DOI
doi:10.1920/wp.ifs.2022.1622
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Armand, Alex
  • Augsburg, Britta
  • Bancalari, Antonella
  • Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS)

Entstanden

  • 2022

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