Arbeitspapier

Does the market discipline banks? New evidence from the regulatory capital mix

Although bank capital regulation permits a bank to choose freely between equity and subordinated debt to meet capital requirements, lenders and investors view debt and equity as imperfect substitutes. It follows that the mix of debt in regulatory capital should isolate the role that the market plays in disciplining banks. I document that since the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA) reduced the ability of the FDIC to absorb losses of subordinated debt investors, the mix of debt has had a positive effect on the future outcomes of distressed banks, as if the presence of debt investors has worked to limit moral hazard. To mitigate concerns about selection, I use the variation across banks in the mix of debt in capital generated by cross-state variation in state corporate income tax rates. Interestingly, instrumental variables (IV) estimates document that selection problems are indeed important, but suggest that the benefits of subordinated debt are even larger. I conclude that the market may play a useful direct role in regulating banks.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Staff Report ; No. 244

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
Corporate Finance and Governance: Government Policy and Regulation
Thema
bank capital regulation, market discipline, subordinated debt
Basler Akkord
USA

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Ashcraft, Adam B.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
(wo)
New York, NY
(wann)
2006

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Ashcraft, Adam B.
  • Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Entstanden

  • 2006

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