Gambling bank behaviour, incentive mechanism, and sanctions: a two-stage model

Abstract: This article analyses the optimal punishment structure set by a regulator in banking markets under asymmetric information. Relying on a theoretical model, we analyse whether a decreasing, constant, or increasing sanction scheme deters potentially repeated offences in banking. We find that an increasing punishment structure is efficient in reducing gambling bank behaviour. This holds if and only if the regulator’s detection probability is low or the amount gambled by the bank, if it would cheat, is high. With this paper, we provide justification for the current policy practice

Location
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
Extent
Online-Ressource
Language
Englisch
Notes
Journal of banking regulation. - 25, 2 (2024) , 197-208, ISSN: 1750-2071

Classification
Wirtschaft

Event
Veröffentlichung
(where)
Freiburg
(who)
Universität
(when)
2023
Creator

DOI
10.1057/s41261-023-00223-w
URN
urn:nbn:de:bsz:25-freidok-2400129
Rights
Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
Last update
14.08.2025, 10:59 AM CEST

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Associated

Time of origin

  • 2023

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