Arbeitspapier

Disputes, debt and equity

We show how the prospect of disputes over firms' revenue reports promotes debt financing over equity. These findings are presented within a costly state verification model with a risk averse entrepreneur. The prospect of disputes encourages incentive contracts that limit penalties and avoid stochastic monitoring, even when the lender can commit to stochastic monitoring strategies. Consequently, optimal contracts shift away from equity and toward standard debt. For a useful special case of the model, closed form solutions are presented for leverage and consumption allocations under efficient debt contracts. Some empirical implications of the theory are pursued.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: School of Economics Discussion Papers ; No. 1716

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Incomplete Markets
General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium: Financial Markets
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Economics of Contract: Theory
Thema
Microeconomics
costly state verification
external finance
leverage

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Duncan, Alfred
Nolan, Charles
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Kent, School of Economics
(wo)
Canterbury
(wann)
2017

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Duncan, Alfred
  • Nolan, Charles
  • University of Kent, School of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2017

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