Arbeitspapier
Gini and Optimal Income Taxation by Rank
We solve the non-linear income tax program for a rank-dependent social welfare function à la Yaari, expressing the trade-off between size and inequality using the Gini or related families of positional indices. The key idea is that when agents optimize and absent bunching, ranks in the actual and optimal allocations become an invariant dimension. This allows us to obtain optimal marginal tax rates as a function of ranks, and numerically illustrate the relationship between ranks and taxes. For singles without children, the actual US tax schedule seems to indicate a distaste for differences in the upper part of the distribution.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 8141
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- Thema
-
Gini
optimal taxation
income taxation
ranks
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Simula, Laurent
Trannoy, Alain
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2020
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Simula, Laurent
- Trannoy, Alain
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2020