Arbeitspapier

Gini and Optimal Income Taxation by Rank

We solve the non-linear income tax program for a rank-dependent social welfare function à la Yaari, expressing the trade-off between size and inequality using the Gini or related families of positional indices. The key idea is that when agents optimize and absent bunching, ranks in the actual and optimal allocations become an invariant dimension. This allows us to obtain optimal marginal tax rates as a function of ranks, and numerically illustrate the relationship between ranks and taxes. For singles without children, the actual US tax schedule seems to indicate a distaste for differences in the upper part of the distribution.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 8141

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Thema
Gini
optimal taxation
income taxation
ranks

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Simula, Laurent
Trannoy, Alain
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2020

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Simula, Laurent
  • Trannoy, Alain
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2020

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