Arbeitspapier

Central bank collateral, asset fire sales, regulation and liquidity

This paper analyses the potential roles of bank asset fire sales and recourse to central bank credit to ensure banks' funding liquidity and solvency. Both asset liquidity and central bank haircuts are modelled as power functions within the unit interval. Funding stability is captured as strategic bank run game in pure strategies between depositors. Asset liquidity, the central bank collateral framework and regulation determine jointly the ability of the banking system to deliver maturity transformation and financial stability. The model also explains why banks tend to use the least liquid eligible assets as central bank collateral and why a sudden non-anticipated reduction of asset liquidity, or a tightening of the collateral framework, can destabilize short term liabilities of banks. Finally, the model allows discussing how the collateral framework can be understood, beyond its essential aim to protect the central bank, as financial stability and non-conventional monetary policy instrument.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: ECB Working Paper ; No. 1610

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Monetary Systems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System; Payment Systems
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Thema
asset liquidity
bank run
central bank collateral framework
liquidity regulation
Unconventional monetary policy

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Bindseil, Ulrich
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
European Central Bank (ECB)
(wo)
Frankfurt a. M.
(wann)
2013

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Bindseil, Ulrich
  • European Central Bank (ECB)

Entstanden

  • 2013

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