Arbeitspapier

Optimal Wage Redistribution in the Presence of Adverse Selection in the Labor Market

In this paper we allude to a novel role played by the non-linear income tax system in the presence of adverse selection in the labor market due to asymmetric information between workers and firms. We show that an appropriate choice of the tax schedule enables the government to affect the wage distribution by controlling the transmission of information in the labor market. This represents an additional channel through which the government can foster the pursuit of its redistributive goals.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 9154

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
Thema
adverse selection
labor market
optimal taxation
pooling
redistribution

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Bastani, Spencer
Blumkin, Tomer
Micheletto, Luca
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2015

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Bastani, Spencer
  • Blumkin, Tomer
  • Micheletto, Luca
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2015

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