Arbeitspapier
Optimal Wage Redistribution in the Presence of Adverse Selection in the Labor Market
In this paper we allude to a novel role played by the non-linear income tax system in the presence of adverse selection in the labor market due to asymmetric information between workers and firms. We show that an appropriate choice of the tax schedule enables the government to affect the wage distribution by controlling the transmission of information in the labor market. This represents an additional channel through which the government can foster the pursuit of its redistributive goals.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 9154
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
- Thema
-
adverse selection
labor market
optimal taxation
pooling
redistribution
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Bastani, Spencer
Blumkin, Tomer
Micheletto, Luca
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2015
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Bastani, Spencer
- Blumkin, Tomer
- Micheletto, Luca
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Entstanden
- 2015