Arbeitspapier

Equity and efficiency in multi-worker firms: Insights from experimental economics

In this paper, we discuss recent evidence from economic experiments that study the impact of social preferences on workplace behavior. We focus on situations in which a single employer interacts with multiple employees. Traditionally, equity and efficiency have been seen as opposing aims in such work environments: individual pay-for-performance schemes maximize efficiency but might lead to inequitable outcomes. We present findings from laboratory experiments that show under which circumstances partially incomplete contracts can create equitable work environments while at the same time reaching surprisingly efficient outcomes.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 5727

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Labor Contracts
Thema
incentives
wage setting
equity
gift exchange
reciprocity
incomplete contracts
organizational economics
laboratory experiments

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Abeler, Johannes
Altmann, Steffen
Goerg, Sebastian J.
Kube, Sebastian
Wibral, Matthias
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2011

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:101:1-201106013413
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Abeler, Johannes
  • Altmann, Steffen
  • Goerg, Sebastian J.
  • Kube, Sebastian
  • Wibral, Matthias
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2011

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