Strategic use of available capacity in the electricity spot market

Arbeitspapier

The literature on deregulated electricity markets generally assumes available capacities to be given. In contrast, this paper studies a model where firms precommit to capacity levels before competing in a uniform price auction. The analysis sheds light on recent empirical findings that firms use their available capacity to obtain high market prices. There exist two equilibria where at least one firm withholds its available capacity to induce the maximum price. Moreover, in one equilibrium, the inefficient firm obtains a relatively large market share.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance ; No. 496

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; Auctions ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; Electric Utilities
• Thema: spot market ; capacity game ; auction mechanism ; electricity ; Elektrizitätswirtschaft ; Deregulierung ; Kapazitätsplanung ; Auktion ; Spieltheorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): LeCoq, Chloé
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Stockholm School of Economics, The Economic Research Institute (EFI)
• (wo): Stockholm
• (wann): 2002

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56141
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ