Patent Scope and Technology Choice

Arbeitspapier

This paper analyzes the effect of an increase in patent scope on R&D and innovation. It presents a model where patent scope affects an entrant firm's technology choice and thereby creates a trade-off between R&D investments and wasteful duplication of R&D. The model predicts that an increase in patent scope can increase the probability of innovation if the incumbent’s profit increase from innovation is large and the patented technology has a small advantage over the alternative technology. However, when the model is extended to Stackelberg competition or licensing, the benefit of a broad patent scope to a large extent disappears.

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• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: IFN Working Paper ; No. 792

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Regulation and Business Law: General ; Economics of Regulation
• Subject: Innovation ; Patents ; Patent policy ; Licensing ; Patent ; Innovation ; Technologiewahl ; Innovationsmanagement ; Duopol ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Färnstrand Damsgaard, Erika
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
• (where): Stockholm
• (when): 2009

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/81526