Arbeitspapier
Patent Scope and Technology Choice
This paper analyzes the effect of an increase in patent scope on R&D and innovation. It presents a model where patent scope affects an entrant firm's technology choice and thereby creates a trade-off between R&D investments and wasteful duplication of R&D. The model predicts that an increase in patent scope can increase the probability of innovation if the incumbents profit increase from innovation is large and the patented technology has a small advantage over the alternative technology. However, when the model is extended to Stackelberg competition or licensing, the benefit of a broad patent scope to a large extent disappears.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IFN Working Paper ; No. 792
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Regulation and Business Law: General
Economics of Regulation
- Thema
-
Innovation
Patents
Patent policy
Licensing
Patent
Innovation
Technologiewahl
Innovationsmanagement
Duopol
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Färnstrand Damsgaard, Erika
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
- (wo)
-
Stockholm
- (wann)
-
2009
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Färnstrand Damsgaard, Erika
- Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
Entstanden
- 2009