Prime Masking vs. Faults - Exponential Security Amplification against Selected Classes of Attacks
Abstract: Fault injection attacks are a serious concern for cryptographic hardware. Adversaries may extract sensitive information from the faulty output that is produced by a cryptographic circuit after actively disturbing its computation. Alternatively, the information whether an output would have been faulty, even if it is withheld from being released, may be exploited. The former class of attacks, which requires the collection of faulty outputs, such as Differential Fault Analysis (DFA), then either exploits some knowledge about the position of the injected fault or about its value. The latter class of attacks, which can be applied without ever obtaining faulty outputs, such as Statistical Ineffective Fault Attacks (SIFA), then either exploits a dependency between the effectiveness of the fault injection and the value to be faulted (e.g., an LSB stuck-at-0 only affecting odd numbers), denoted as SIFA-1, or a conditional propagation of a faulted value based on a sensitive intermediate (e.g.... https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/11807
- Standort
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Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Umfang
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Online-Ressource
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Prime Masking vs. Faults - Exponential Security Amplification against Selected Classes of Attacks ; volume:2024 ; number:4 ; year:2024
IACR transactions on cryptographic hardware and embedded systems ; 2024, Heft 4 (2024)
- Urheber
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Moos, Thorben
Saha, Sayandeep
Standaert, François-Xavier
- DOI
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10.46586/tches.v2024.i4.690-736
- URN
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urn:nbn:de:101:1-2409251854151.772343921142
- Rechteinformation
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Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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15.08.2025, 07:36 MESZ
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Beteiligte
- Moos, Thorben
- Saha, Sayandeep
- Standaert, François-Xavier