Arbeitspapier
Who makes a good leader? Social preferences and leading-by-example
We examine the effects of social preferences and beliefs about the social preferences of others in a simple leader-follower voluntary contributions game. We find that groups perform best when led by those who are reciprocally oriented. Part of the effect can be explained by a false consensus effect: selfish players tend to think it more likely that they are matched with another selfish player and reciprocators tend to think it more likely that they are matched with another reciprocator. Thus, reciprocators contribute more as leaders partly because they are more optimistic than selfish players about the reciprocal responses of followers. However, even after controlling for beliefs we find that reciprocally-oriented leaders contribute more than selfish leaders. Thus, we conclude that differing leader contributions by differing types of leader must in large part reflect social motivations.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 3914
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Relation of Economics to Social Values
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
- Thema
-
Reciprocity
contribution preferences
leadership
leading-by-example
false consensus effect
Führungstheorie
Austauschtheorie (Soziologie)
Spieltheorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Gächter, Simon
Nosenzo, Daniele
Renner, Elke
Sefton, Martin
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2008
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:101:1-20090119104
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Gächter, Simon
- Nosenzo, Daniele
- Renner, Elke
- Sefton, Martin
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Entstanden
- 2008