Arbeitspapier

Who makes a good leader? Social preferences and leading-by-example

We examine the effects of social preferences and beliefs about the social preferences of others in a simple leader-follower voluntary contributions game. We find that groups perform best when led by those who are reciprocally oriented. Part of the effect can be explained by a false consensus effect: selfish players tend to think it more likely that they are matched with another selfish player and reciprocators tend to think it more likely that they are matched with another reciprocator. Thus, reciprocators contribute more as leaders partly because they are more optimistic than selfish players about the reciprocal responses of followers. However, even after controlling for beliefs we find that reciprocally-oriented leaders contribute more than selfish leaders. Thus, we conclude that differing leader contributions by differing types of leader must in large part reflect social motivations.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 3914

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Relation of Economics to Social Values
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Thema
Reciprocity
contribution preferences
leadership
leading-by-example
false consensus effect
Führungstheorie
Austauschtheorie (Soziologie)
Spieltheorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Gächter, Simon
Nosenzo, Daniele
Renner, Elke
Sefton, Martin
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2008

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:101:1-20090119104
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Gächter, Simon
  • Nosenzo, Daniele
  • Renner, Elke
  • Sefton, Martin
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2008

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