Who makes a good leader? Social preferences and leading-by-example

Arbeitspapier

We examine the effects of social preferences and beliefs about the social preferences of others in a simple leader-follower voluntary contributions game. We find that groups perform best when led by those who are reciprocally oriented. Part of the effect can be explained by a false consensus effect: selfish players tend to think it more likely that they are matched with another selfish player and reciprocators tend to think it more likely that they are matched with another reciprocator. Thus, reciprocators contribute more as leaders partly because they are more optimistic than selfish players about the reciprocal responses of followers. However, even after controlling for beliefs we find that reciprocally-oriented leaders contribute more than selfish leaders. Thus, we conclude that differing leader contributions by differing types of leader must in large part reflect social motivations.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 3914

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Relation of Economics to Social Values ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
• Thema: Reciprocity ; contribution preferences ; leadership ; leading-by-example ; false consensus effect ; Führungstheorie ; Austauschtheorie (Soziologie) ; Spieltheorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Gächter, Simon ; Nosenzo, Daniele ; Renner, Elke ; Sefton, Martin
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
• (wo): Bonn
• (wann): 2008

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/35298
• URN: urn:nbn:de:101:1-20090119104
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ