Arbeitspapier

What goes around comes around: A theory of indirect reciprocity in networks

We consider strategic interaction on a network of heterogeneous long-term relationships. The bilateral relationships are independent of each other in terms of actions and realized payoffs, and we assume that information regarding outcomes is private to the two parties involved. In spite of this, the network can induce strategic interdependencies between relationships, which facilitate efficient outcomes. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions that characterize efficient equilibria of the network game in terms of the architecture of the underlying network, and interpret these structural conditions in light of empirical regularities observed in many social and economic networks.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CAE Working Paper ; No. 09-07

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Thema
network enforcement
private monitoring
small-worlds
triadic closure

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Mihm, Maximilian
Toth, Russell
Lang, Corey
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Cornell University, Center for Analytical Economics (CAE)
(wo)
Ithaca, NY
(wann)
2009

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Mihm, Maximilian
  • Toth, Russell
  • Lang, Corey
  • Cornell University, Center for Analytical Economics (CAE)

Entstanden

  • 2009

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