Arbeitspapier

Stock options and chief executive officer compensation

Although stock options are commonly observed in chief executive o±cer (CEO) compensation contracts, there is theoretical controversy about whether stock options are part of the optimal contract. Using a sample of Fortune 500 companies, we solve an agency model calibrated to the company-specific data and we find that stock options are almost always part of the optimal contract. This result is robust to alternative assumptions about the level of CEO risk-aversion and the disutility associated with their effort. In a supplementary analysis, we solve for the optimal contract when there are no restrictions on the contract space. We find that the optimal contract (which is characterized as a state-contingent payoff to the CEO) typically has option-like features over the most probable range of outcomes.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1447

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Economics of Contract: Theory
Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
Labor Contracts
Thema
Stock options
incentives
agency model

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Armstrong, Christopher S.
Larcker, David F.
Su, Che-Lin
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
(wo)
Evanston, IL
(wann)
2007

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Armstrong, Christopher S.
  • Larcker, David F.
  • Su, Che-Lin
  • Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science

Entstanden

  • 2007

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