Arbeitspapier

A Fresh Look at Fiscal Redistribution and Inequality in the US across Electoral Cycles

The evolution of the ratio of direct taxation (characterized by progressive rates) over indirect and payroll taxation (characterized by flat rates) is examined together with its distributional consequences for the Bottom 50%, Middle 40% and Top 10% shares of income. Oscillations of this ratio coincide with the US electoral cycles since the 1960s. We show that periods in which this ratio increases coincide with those in which Democrats rule the government and there is more redistribution from the rich (the Top 10%) to the rest of the population. Conversely, periods in which this ratio falls and Republicans hold the power are characterized by a fall in the ratio and less redistribution from the rich to the rest of the population. Based on a set of counterfactual simulations, we hypothesize that the rich, as informed economic agents, are able to protect themselves against tighter fiscal conditions, thereby curtailing the redistributive effects of enhanced tax progressivity.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 11839

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General
Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents: Household
Aggregate Factor Income Distribution
Thema
electoral cycles
tax composition
income distribution
tax progressivity

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Sala, Hector
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2018

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Sala, Hector
  • Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2018

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