Promotion: Turnover and Preemptive Wage Offers

Arbeitspapier

This paper examines the strategic promotion and wage decisions of employers when employees may be more valuable to competing firms, even in the presence of firm specific human capital. Competing employers must incur a cost to learn the quality of their match with a manager. Because promotion signal that workers are potentially valuable managers in other firms, it can induce turnover. To preempt competition for a promoted worker, an employer may offer a wage so high that it discourages competitors from acquiring information and bidding up the wage further or hiring the worker away. Also, to avoid competition, employers will fail to promote some less well-matched workers who should be promoted.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Queen's Economics Department Working Paper ; No. 817

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Bernhardt, Dan ; Scoones, David
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Queen's University, Department of Economics
• (wo): Kingston (Ontario)
• (wann): 1991

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/189141
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ