Arbeitspapier

Revisiting the Capital Tax Ambiguity Result

We provide a welfare based interpretation of the capital tax ambiguity result (due to Guo & Lansing, 1999). We show that the sign ambiguity of optimal capital tax rate in an imperfectly competitive economy is mainly due to the welfare cost of investment. The substitution and income effects of profit seeking investment reinforce each other which create a deadweight loss in welfare. Investors cannot perceive this effect and never invest at the right level. This loss is perceived only by the government which motivates capital taxation.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Cardiff Economics Working Papers ; No. E2006/20

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Monopoly
Fiscal Policy
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents: General
Thema
Optimal taxation
Monopoly power
Ramsey policy

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Selim, Sheikh
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School
(wo)
Cardiff
(wann)
2006

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Selim, Sheikh
  • Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School

Entstanden

  • 2006

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