Arbeitspapier
Are "innocuous" Minimum Quality Standards really innocuous?
The present note shows that "innocuous" Minimum Quality Standards, namely standards that are below the lowest quality level observed in the market, may have effects on equilibrium outcomes. In particular this is true in a duopoly where one high quality firm invests in R&D to lower its cost of quality improvements. A Standard that is below, but close to, the lowest quality observed in the market reduces the incentive to invest by the quality leading firm.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 515
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Subject
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Produktqualität
Standardisierung
Oligopol
Produktdifferenzierung
Forschung
Theorie
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Garella, Paolo G.
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
- (where)
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Bologna
- (when)
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2004
- DOI
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doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4777
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Garella, Paolo G.
- Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
Time of origin
- 2004