Arbeitspapier

Are "innocuous" Minimum Quality Standards really innocuous?

The present note shows that "innocuous" Minimum Quality Standards, namely standards that are below the lowest quality level observed in the market, may have effects on equilibrium outcomes. In particular this is true in a duopoly where one high quality firm invests in R&D to lower its cost of quality improvements. A Standard that is below, but close to, the lowest quality observed in the market reduces the incentive to invest by the quality leading firm.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 515

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
Produktqualität
Standardisierung
Oligopol
Produktdifferenzierung
Forschung
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Garella, Paolo G.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
(where)
Bologna
(when)
2004

DOI
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4777
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Garella, Paolo G.
  • Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)

Time of origin

  • 2004

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