Arbeitspapier

On the Effectiveness of Debt Brakes: The Swiss Experience

The Swiss fiscal system is characterised by an extensive fiscal federalism with high fiscal autonomy at all governmental levels, by direct popular rights which include fiscal referenda at the cantonal and local levels, and by particular constitutional and/or statutory fiscal restraints in order to prevent excessive public debt. In this paper, the effects of these constitutional clauses on public deficit and debt are investigated. Using a panel of the 26 Swiss cantons from 1980 to 1998, we provide evidence that fiscal constraints significantly reduce budget deficits, while direct democracy leads to significantly lower public debt.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CREMA Working Paper ; No. 2006-21

Classification
Wirtschaft
State and Local Borrowing
Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession
Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
Subject
Direct Democracy
Referenda
Initiatives
Public Debt
Budget Deficits

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Feld, Lars P.
Kirchgassner, Gebhard
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA)
(where)
Basel
(when)
2006

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Feld, Lars P.
  • Kirchgassner, Gebhard
  • Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA)

Time of origin

  • 2006

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