Collusive compensation schemes aided by algorithms

Arbeitspapier

Sophisticated collusive compensation schemes such as assigning future market shares or direct transfers are frequently observed in detected cartels. We show formally why these schemes are useful for dampening deviation incentives when colluding firms are temporary asymmetric. The relative attractiveness of each of these schemes is shaped by firms' ability to predict future market conditions, possibly aided by algorithms. Prices and profits are inverse u-shaped in prediction ability. Assigning future market shares is optimal when prediction ability is intermediate, and otherwise direct transfers are optimal. Competition authority's limited resources should be utilized to respond to these changing market conditions.

Object Details

• ISBN: 978-3-86304-374-2
• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: DICE Discussion Paper ; No. 375

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Firm Behavior: Theory ; Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices ; Economics of Regulation
• Subject: algorithmic collusion ; market forecasting ; prediction ability ; firm asymmetry ; compensation schemes

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Martin, Simon ; Schmal, W. Benedikt
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
• (where): Düsseldorf
• (when): 2021

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/248280
• Last update: 2025-03-10T11:45:07+0100