Arbeitspapier
Collusive Compensation Schemes Aided by Algorithms
Sophisticated collusive compensation schemes such as assigning future market shares or direct transfers are frequently observed in detected cartels. We show formally why these schemes are useful for dampening deviation incentives when colluding firms are temporary asymmetric. The relative attractiveness of each of these schemes is shaped by firms’ ability to predict future market conditions, possibly aided by algorithms. Prices and profits are inverse u-shaped in prediction ability. Assigning future market shares is optimal when prediction ability is intermediate, and otherwise direct transfers are optimal. Competition authority's limited resources should be utilized to respond to these changing market conditions.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 9481
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Firm Behavior: Theory
Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
Economics of Regulation
- Thema
-
algorithmic collusion
market forecasting
prediction ability
firm asymmetry
compensation schemes
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Martin, Simon
Schmal, Wolfgang Benedikt
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
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Munich
- (wann)
-
2021
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Martin, Simon
- Schmal, Wolfgang Benedikt
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2021