Against an Identity Criterion for Fictional Ersatz Realism

Abstract: Fictional ersatz realism is the metaphysical stance that abstract fictional entities exist and are dependent on fiction and literary practices. Everett [4] tackled the position of ersatz realism by claiming that the ersatz realist cannot provide an identity criterion for fictional entities that does not imply a contradiction. Al- though Woodward [20] proposed a defense to Everett's argument, I will argue that ersatz realism is no tenable position, as it still cannot provide an adequate identity criterion. To establish this result, I will provide a base frame for identity criteria available to the ersatz realist. Afterwords, I will show that to any identity criterion the ersatz realist may propose there is a story such that a fictional entity corresponding to this story is not self-identical, imposing a contradiction to the metaphysical account of ersatz realism.

Object Details

• Location: Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
• Extent: Online-Ressource
• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Against an Identity Criterion for Fictional Ersatz Realism ; volume:32 ; number:3 ; year:2018 ; pages:89-108 ; extent:20 ; Kriterion ; 32, Heft 3 (2018), 89-108 (gesamt 20)

Contributors, Places and Time

• Creator: Meier, Timo

Further information

• DOI: 10.1515/krt-2018-320307
• URN: urn:nbn:de:101:1-2022090315175776296177
• Rights: Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
• Last update: 15.08.2025, 7:34 AM CEST