Democracy and International Conflict

Arbeitspapier

During the past two centuries, western nations have successively extended the voting franchise to citizens of lower income. We explain this process of democratization as a rational way for incumbent elites to wage war effectively on other nations, as in a strategic game of international conflict handing over military spending decisions to citizens who face a lower tax cost of arming may confer a strategic delegation advantage. We find supporting empirical evidence in case studies of franchise extensions in the United Kingdom, France, and the United States.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 5856

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions ; International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions ; Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
• Thema: war ; conflict ; contest ; democracy ; franchise extension

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Vesperoni, Alberto ; Wärneryd, Karl
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (wo): Munich
• (wann): 2016

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/141833
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ