Abuse of forward contracts to semi-collude in volatile markets

Konferenzbeitrag

I model the optimal semi-collusive strategy of firms using forward contracts in volatile markets. It has been shown that forward contracts can be used to stabilize a collusive agreement under deterministic (Liski and Montero, 2006) as well as under stochastic market conditions (Aichele, 2012). However, forward trading has a negative effect on the expected profit for collusive firms, since firms have the obligation to fulfill their forward contracts in booms as well as in recessions. Thus, in recessions firms involuntarily sell more than the optimal collusive amount. This profit decreasing effect of forward trading is in contrast to the existing literature, since under certainty forward trading does not alter the collusive profit.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2013: Wettbewerbspolitik und Regulierung in einer globalen Wirtschaftsordnung - Session: Cartels and Tacit Collusion ; No. D13-V1

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; Antitrust Law

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Aichele, Markus
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
• (wo): Kiel und Hamburg
• (wann): 2013

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/79755
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 20.09.2024, 08:22 MESZ