Hybrid assessment scheme based on the stern-judging rule for maintaining cooperation under indirect reciprocity

Artikel

Intensive studies on indirect reciprocity have explored rational assessment rules for maintaining cooperation and several have demonstrated the effects of the stern-judging rule. Uchida and Sasaki demonstrated that the stern-judging rule is not suitable for maintaining cooperative regimes in private assessment conditions while a public assessment system has been assumed in most studies. Although both assessment systems are oversimplified and society is most accurately represented by a mixture of these systems, little analysis has been reported on their mixture. Here, we investigated how much weight on the use of information originating from a public source is needed to maintain cooperative regimes for players adopting the stern-judging rule when players get information from both public and private sources. We did this by considering a hybrid-assessment scheme in which players use both assessment systems and by using evolutionary game theory. We calculated replicator equations using the expected payoffs of three strategies: unconditional cooperation, unconditional defection, and stern-judging rule adoption. Our analysis shows that the use of the rule helps to maintain cooperation if reputation information from a unique public notice board is used with more than a threshold probability. This hybrid-assessment scheme can be applied to other rules, including the simple-standing rule and the staying rule.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Journal: Games ; ISSN: 2073-4336 ; Volume: 11 ; Year: 2020 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 1-10 ; Basel: MDPI

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium ; Noncooperative Games ; Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
• Thema: evolution of cooperation ; evolutionary game ; image score ; indirect reciprocity ; Kandori norm ; private assessment ; reputation ; social dilemma

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Okada, Isamu ; Yamamoto, Hitoshi ; Uchida, Satoshi
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): MDPI
• (wo): Basel
• (wann): 2020

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.3390/g11010013
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/219284
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ