Who do you blame in local finance? An analysis of municipal financing in Italy

Arbeitspapier

A 1999 reform allowed Italian Mayors to partially substitute a more accountable source of tax revenue (the property tax) with a less transparent one (a surcharge on the personal income tax). Theoretical analysis suggests this should give incompetent Mayors a less costly way to hide themselves, so allowing them to be more easily re-elected. An empirical analysis on Piedmont municipalities confirms these hypotheses.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3100

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue ; Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession ; Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
• Thema: partial decentralization ; fiscal federalism ; transparency ; political behavior ; Gemeindesteuer ; Steuerpolitik ; Public Choice ; Finanzföderalismus ; Theorie ; Italien

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Bordignon, Massimo ; Piazza, Santino
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (wo): Munich
• (wann): 2010

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/38915
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ