Arbeitspapier

The effects of privatization on R&D investments and patent productivity

Over the last two decades privatization programs in different countries radically reduced the role of the State as a key player in the economic arena. We use agency theory to discuss the theoretical relationship between changes in the firm's principal-agent structure following privatization, and incentives to invest in R&D and to patent. We compare the pre and post privatization R&D effort and patenting behavior of 35 companies that were fully or partially privatized in 9 European countries through public share offering between 1980 and 1997. Results show that, after controlling for inter-industry differences, privatization processes negatively affect different measures of R&D commitment. Moreover, the shift from public to private ownership leads to a significant increase in the quantity of patents granted and in their quality, measured by citations' intensity.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 64.2002

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
Thema
Privatization
R&D investments
patents
inventions
Privatisierung
Industrielle Forschung
Patent
Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie
Innovation
Eigentümerstruktur
Schätzung
EU-Staaten

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Munari, Federico
Sobrero, Maurizio
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
(wo)
Milano
(wann)
2002

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Munari, Federico
  • Sobrero, Maurizio
  • Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Entstanden

  • 2002

Ähnliche Objekte (12)