Arbeitspapier

Institutional constraints to political budget cycles in the enlarged EU

This paper revisits Political Budget Cycles (PBCs) in the enlarged European Union (EU). Based on a panel of 25 current EU member states from 1996 to 2012, we show that governments frequently fiscally stimulate the economy prior to elections; a phenomenon that is seemingly not only an 'Eastern problem' of the EU's new members, as has been suggested in the literature. We argue that fiscal institutions are apt to reduce the extent of opportunistic fiscal behaviour both in these younger democracies as well as in other EU member states that lack a strong press to hold governments accountable. Yet, we conclude that in order to eradicate PBCs in the enlarged EU, a powerful press remains key.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Kiel Working Paper ; No. 1964

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
Central and Eastern Europe
Enlargement
Fiscal Institutions
Political Budget Cycles
Press Freedom

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Ademmer, Esther
Dreher, Ferdinand
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
(wo)
Kiel
(wann)
2014

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Ademmer, Esther
  • Dreher, Ferdinand
  • Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)

Entstanden

  • 2014

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