Arbeitspapier

Better the Devil that You Know: Evidence on Entry Costs Faced by Foreign Banks

Institutional and legal differences between countries increase entry costs and reduce the ability of banks to expand abroad. We use bilateral foreign banking data for 176 countries to estimate a gravity model in which bilateral cross-border banking activity is explained, in addition to standard variables, by legal and institutional differences. We find that foreign banking is negatively affected by absolute differences in the legal setup and in basic institutions between source and host countries. Differences in the legal origin, for example, reduce bilateral participation in the banking system by nearly 11 percent. Additionally we do not find strong evidence suggesting asymmetries in adapting to “better” or “worse” institutional/legal environments.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Working Paper ; No. 477

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
Auslandsinvestition
Internationale Bank
Institutionelle Infrastruktur
Gravitationsmodell
Welt

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Galindo, Arturo
Micco, Alejandro
Serra, César Manuel
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department
(where)
Washington, DC
(when)
2003

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Galindo, Arturo
  • Micco, Alejandro
  • Serra, César Manuel
  • Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department

Time of origin

  • 2003

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