Institutionalizing Personalism: The Russian Presidency after Constitutional Changes

Abstract: The 2020 constitutional changes considerably increase presidential powers while sending mixed signals about presidential transition. The main driver of the amendments were term limits. The "zeroing" of Putin’s presidential terms enhances certainty for himself by fostering uncertainty for others. But there is more to the amendments: Numerous changes are not new, they simply align the constitutional text with subconstitutional powers the presidency had been accumulating. The embedding of term limit circumvention in a comprehensive constitutional overhaul is a risk- hedging strategy to avert resistance by weakening the signal about Putin's intentions. Constitutional changes are therefore an instrument of elite coordination. The amendments also increase presidential flexibility. This expedited regime personalization is detrimental to governance and will make repression more prevalent. But it also creates more risks for Putin. Regardless of how presidential succession will play out, Put

Standort
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
Umfang
Online-Ressource
Sprache
Englisch
Anmerkungen
Postprint
begutachtet (peer reviewed)
In: Russian Politics ; 6 (2021) 1 ; 50-70

Klassifikation
Politik

Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wo)
Mannheim
(wer)
SSOAR, GESIS – Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften e.V.
(wann)
2021
Urheber
Burkhardt, Fabian

DOI
10.30965/24518921-00601004
URN
urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-73662-2
Rechteinformation
Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
Letzte Aktualisierung
25.03.2025, 13:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Beteiligte

  • Burkhardt, Fabian
  • SSOAR, GESIS – Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften e.V.

Entstanden

  • 2021

Ähnliche Objekte (12)