Institutionalizing Personalism: The Russian Presidency after Constitutional Changes
Abstract: The 2020 constitutional changes considerably increase presidential powers while sending mixed signals about presidential transition. The main driver of the amendments were term limits. The "zeroing" of Putin’s presidential terms enhances certainty for himself by fostering uncertainty for others. But there is more to the amendments: Numerous changes are not new, they simply align the constitutional text with subconstitutional powers the presidency had been accumulating. The embedding of term limit circumvention in a comprehensive constitutional overhaul is a risk- hedging strategy to avert resistance by weakening the signal about Putin's intentions. Constitutional changes are therefore an instrument of elite coordination. The amendments also increase presidential flexibility. This expedited regime personalization is detrimental to governance and will make repression more prevalent. But it also creates more risks for Putin. Regardless of how presidential succession will play out, Put
- Standort
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Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Umfang
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Online-Ressource
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Anmerkungen
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Postprint
begutachtet (peer reviewed)
In: Russian Politics ; 6 (2021) 1 ; 50-70
- Klassifikation
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Politik
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wo)
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Mannheim
- (wer)
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SSOAR, GESIS – Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften e.V.
- (wann)
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2021
- Urheber
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Burkhardt, Fabian
- DOI
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10.30965/24518921-00601004
- URN
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urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-73662-2
- Rechteinformation
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Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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25.03.2025, 13:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Beteiligte
- Burkhardt, Fabian
- SSOAR, GESIS – Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften e.V.
Entstanden
- 2021