Artikel
On selecting the right agent
Each period, a principal must assign one of two agents to a new task. Profit is stochastically higher when the agent is qualified for the task, but the principal cannot observe qualification. Her only decision is which of the two agents to assign, if any, given the public history of selections and profits, but she cannot commit to any rule. While she maximizes expected discounted profits, each agent maximizes his expected discounted selection probabilities. We fully characterize when the principal's first-best payoff is attainable in equilibrium, and identify a simple, belief-free, strategy profile achieving this first-best whenever feasible. Addionally, we provide a partial characterization of the case with many agents and discuss how our analysis extends to other variations of the game.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 16 ; Year: 2021 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 381-402 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- Subject
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Dynamic mechanism design without commitment
dynamic mechanism design without transfers
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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De Clippel, Geoffroy
Eliaz, Kfir
Fershtman, Daniel
Rozen, Kareen
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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The Econometric Society
- (where)
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New Haven, CT
- (when)
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2021
- DOI
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doi:10.3982/TE4027
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Artikel
Associated
- De Clippel, Geoffroy
- Eliaz, Kfir
- Fershtman, Daniel
- Rozen, Kareen
- The Econometric Society
Time of origin
- 2021
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