Arbeitspapier
A Flexible Test for Present Bias and Time Preferences using Land-Lease Contracts
When agents have present bias, they discount more between now and thenext period than between period t (> 1) and t + 1. How fast the future discount rate (evaluated today) decays is an empirical question. Weshow that the discount function can be non-parametrically identified withcontracts that specify payments that take place at various points in timein the future and which are traded and priced in a competitive market.We use a unique land lease-contract data set for Amsterdam, which hasthe above properties, to test for present bias in a flexible way. We findno evidence for present bias in this market. Even though we allow for ageneral-hyperbolic specification (which has exponential discounting as aspecial case), our estimates converge to an exponential discount functionwith a corresponding discount rate (in our baseline specification) of 8 %.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 11-087/3
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Model Evaluation, Validation, and Selection
Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
- Thema
-
present bias
hyperbolic discounting
discount rate
hedonic estimation
Zeitpräferenz
Abzinsung
Bodennutzung
Immobilien-Leasing
Amsterdam
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Gautier, Pieter A.
van Vuuren, Aico
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (wo)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (wann)
-
2011
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Gautier, Pieter A.
- van Vuuren, Aico
- Tinbergen Institute
Entstanden
- 2011
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